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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
BANKY"- AND BANKING-NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-INDORSEMENT OP FORG-
E1 CHEcK.-Plaintiff, nowing that the one who signed the drawer's name
was not the drawer herself, but not knowing further of signer's lack of au-
thority, presented a check drawn on defendant bank in which bank the sup-
posed drawer had an account but not sufficient to cover the check. The check
was payable to plaintiff and indorsed by him and was placed to his credit in
the bank. After discovering the forgery defendant charged tle check to
plaintiff's account. Plaintiff objected to such charge. Held, that the defend-
ant might repudiate the payment as the plaintiff was not a bona fide holder
within the general rule. Woodward v. Savings and T'ust Co. (N. C., igig),
100 S. R. 304.
The proposition for which the plaintiff contended is unquestionably sup-
ported by the weight of authority. The doctrine was first adopted by Lord
Mansfield in Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1354, and was followed by Justice Story
in Bank of U. S. v. Bank of Georgia, io Wheat. 333. See also Bank v. Burk-
hardt, ioo U. S. 686, 25 L. Ed. 766; American Exchange Bank v. Gregg, X38
Ill. 596, 28 N. E. 839, 32 Am. St. Rep. z73. There is no distinction between
the case of a holder before and after acceptance. Ban-k of U. S. v. Bank ol
Georgia, supra; National Park Bank v. Ninth National Bank, 46 N. Y. 77.
The reason Qf the rule seems to rest on the presumption that a bank knows
the signature of its customers and likewise upon convenience in commercial
transactions. Bank of U. S. v. Bank of Georgia, supra. However there are
several qualifications to this rule, of which the principal, case is a fair illustra-
tion. The holder must be bona fide, guilty of no actual or constructive fraud.
or negligence contributing to the mistake. Smith v. Mercer, 6 Taunt. 76;
Leather Manufacturers' Bank v. Morgan, 117 U. S. 96. In the principal case
the plaintiff was not such a holder. A party who demands re-payment after
discovering the forgery must act promptly. Levy v. Bank of U. S., 4 Dallas.
234; Bank of U. S. v. Bank of Georgia, supra. The general rule is clearly at
variance with the principle that money paid under a mistake of fact may be
recovered. This" the courts have not failed to recognize. The soundness of
the doctrine is questioned by Mr. Daniels in his. work on NEGOTiABLE INSTRU-
mNTS, vol. 2, Sec. 1361, in which a distinction is drawn between the case
of an accepted and ai unaccepted bill. Mr. Daniels points out that when the
holder of an unaccepted bill presents the bill for payment the holder stands
to the drawee as a warrantor of the genuineness of the bill by his indorse-
ment or by the very assertion of ownership, and that the acceptor should be
allowed to recover the amount paid, provided he acts with due diligence after
learning that the bill is a forgery. In support of this view the following
cases are cited. . First National Bank of Crawfordsville v. First National
Bank of LafaYet, 4 Ind. App. 35;Warren-Scharf Asphalt Paving Co. v.
Commercial Bank, 97 Fed. i81. See also, Ellis and Morton v. Ohio Life In-
surance and Trust Co., 4 Ohio St. 628. These authorities can hardly be said
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entirely to support the contention of Mr, Daniels but they indicate that the
general rule is by no means decisive in favor of the payee of a forged check
or bill to which he has himself given credit by his indorsement. See also 13
MIcH. L. Ezv. 6oz; X4 Micn- L. Rzv. ISI.
BouNDAa1s--LiNr MA x ..xD Suavlvm PRZVAILS OvMR DzscairoN iN
DaZn.-Defendant and M4, tenants in common, agreed to partition; they em-
ployed a surveyor to run the division line, which was done in presence of
the co-owners. The deed of partition, however, described a line not in accord
with the one marked out. In action by M's remote grantee to establish the
-boundary according to the deed, held the following instruction was correct:
" C where, with a view to making a deed or a division, the parties go upon
the land and have a line marked and surveyed, intending it to be the line and
to be included in the deed, then the line so surveyed and marked prevails
against the description in the deed where there is a difference between them."
Dudley v. Jeffress (No. Car., igig), Ioo S. E. 253.
It is familiar and sound doctrine that where calls in a deed for monu-
ments conflict with other calls the former shall in general prevail. Hoban v..
Cable, 1o2 Mich. 2o6; Whitehead v. Ragan, io6 Mo. 231. And the rule is
very properly applied where the deed calls for monuments which are not
then in existence but which the parties later set. Makepeace v. Bancroft, 12
Mass. 469; Lerned v. Morrill, 2 N. H. 197. Cf. Cleaveland v. Flagg, 4 Cush.
76; Miles v. Burrows, 122 Mass. 579. Some courts have gone beyond this.
For example, irt Burkholder v. Markley, 98 Pa. 37, in an action of tqespass
the turning point was the proper location of a boundary line; if the line was
to be run according to the calls in the deed, the defendant had trespassed;
but if the true division line was one marked out by the parties on the land
itself, then no trespass had been committed. The court held evidence should
have been admitted ;s to the line actually marked out. Emery v. Fowler, 38
Me. 99, is to the same effect. It is this dioctrine which is announced in the
principal case. In an action to reform the deed or to establish a boundary
line by acquiescence (see Gertzer v. Kammerer, 13 Phila. i9o), such evidence
would seem entirely proper. Since, however, land can be conveyed only by
ded--or at least by a writing-it is submitted that the doctrine applied in
the principal case goes a step too far.
CA Rs-LIVE STocx-INTRsTAsr SuIPxENT-LIMIrATIoN or Lmnrrv
-TRANSPORThTION-TIM OR CLAi.-Plaintiff shipped a carload of horses
from Texas to New York tinder a contract, inter alia, limiting the railway's
liability to damages caused in. actual transportation, claims for which were
presented within five days. After arrival at destination and process of un-
loading under control of plaintiff had commenced the car was struck by an-
other car and several of the horses were injured. Held, Clarke, McKenna,
Brandeis and Day, JJ. dissenting,, the car was still in transit and the pro-
vision as to notice applied. ErieR. Co. v. Skuart ('gig), 39 Sap. Ct. 519.
On the question of notice where the injury is caused while the goods are
still represented by the bill of lading, see 17 MICH. L. Rev. 42o, where a sim-
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ilar provision was upheld in the case there noted. Such time limit 
must be
reasonable in its effect on both parties. The instant case assumes 
this point
as to. the facts in band in sustaining the general proposition that 
limitations
are valid. The issue involved in the opinion of the court lies in the 
inter-
pretation of the term "transportation" as used in the Hepburn 
Amendment.
To determine this question the court resorts to the case of 
Cleveland, Cin-
cinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company v. Dittelbach, 
239 U. S. 588,
purporting to find there authority in point. That cage involved 
the extent
of the railway company's liability for services extrinsic 
to those ordinarily
assumed 'uhder the common law but imposed by the Amendmcnt. 
The goods
were still in the hands of the company and plaintiff had not 
accepted a deliv-
ery thereof. Under the circumstances, the court held the 
term "transporta-
tion" included storage and all other services rendered or 
imposed aftei ar-
rival and that since the goods had not been delivered to the 
consignee the
nature of the position of the company, in view of the 
Amendment became
immaterial. No question of delivery was involved. As pointed 
out by Clarke,
J., delivery is the one thing present in this case which changes 
the carrier
relation. The property had been. accepted by the consignee: 
and since noth-
ing further remained to be done by the carrier, delivery was 
complete. St.
Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Crawford (Texas) 35 S. W. 748. 
Commonly, it-i
true, the relation of carrier continues after arfival for a reasonable 
time to
allow removal. Columbus W. Ry. Co. v. Ludden, 89 Ala. 612; 
Rome R. Co.
v. Sullivamn, 14 Ga. 277; McMillan v. M. S. &' N. J. R. R. 
Co., z6 Mich. 79;
Winslow v. Vermont & M. R. Co., 42 Vt. 7oo. But a delivery 
an( accept-
ance at any time after arrival may terminate the relation. 
Texas & Pacific
Ry. Co. v. Schneider, i White & W. Civ. Cas. Ct. App. sec. 
ixg. Nothing
in the Hepburn Act in any way a~fects these several rights. 
Its application
therefore in this case hardly warrants the decision.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-D9INITION ov AmMgDENT.-Plaintiff 
seeks a writ
of mandamus commanding the Secretary of State to publish 
an amendment
to the state Constitution. approved by a majority of te electors 
voting at the
election of November, 19i8. Defendant set up an amendment, 
submitted at the
same election, which' amendment was in conflict with, and approved 
by a larger
majority than that set up by plaintiff. Held, the constitutional provision that,
of two conflicting proposed amendments approved at the same 
election the'
one receiving the highest affirmative vote shall be the amendment, 
is applicable.
In his opinion, Johnson, J., further declared, "an amendment to the constitu-
tion, which is made by the addition of a provision on a new and independent
subject, is a complete thing in itself, and may be wholly disconnected 
with
other provisions of the constitution; such amendments, for instance, as 
the
first ten amendments to the constitution of the United States. These were
therein referred to as articles in addition to and amendment of the constitu-
tion." State v. Fultons (Ohio, IxPig), 124 N. E. 172.
The quotation would seem to be dictum, but it is interesting on account 
of
its possible bearing on the Eighteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
The Eighteenth Amendment does not alter or change -ny article in 
the
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present constitution, but consists entirely of new matter; and it is possible
that, failing in other points of attack, its opponents may resort to this feature.
However, it is submitted that the view of the court in the instant case is the
only one tenable. Amendment is defined in the Century Dictionary as "An
alteration * * * in a constitution; a change made in a law either by way of
correction or addition." Furthermore, common sense points out that an
amendment like the Eighteenth, -though it may not alter the subject matter
of any part of the present constitution, certainly changes the whole by enlarg-
ing its scope. A number of the earliir amendments to the Federal Constitu-
tion, especially the Sixth, Seventh, and Fourteenth, contained new matter,
but they have come down to the present time without any serious contest on
tthis point. See also: People v. Sours, 31 Colo. 369; Livermore v. Waite, 1oa
Cal. 113.
COVuNANTS-BUILDING RESTRicTIoNs-PoRcHZS AND PORTE-CoCHMS ]X-
czTE D A deed prohibited the grantee from erecting any building "except
a division fence of [sic] porte-cochere or porch within five feet. from the
side line of said lot." The grantee erected a structure over the drive way
within the five foot limit, which had, for the lower part, solid side walls, and
removable hanging doors for the front and rear openings, and the grantee
used this for housing his. automobile. Above this as a second story, he erected
a room, inclosed on the three exterior sides mainly by windows and contain-
ing a hot water radiator, which room he used as a sleeping porch. All of this
structure wasattached to the house. Held, that this was a porte-cochere be-
low and porch above within the exception to the building restriction, and not
a violation thereof. Conrad v..Boogher (Mo., 1919), 214 S.W. 211.
In the matter of building restrictions the courts have had to deal with
the problem as to whether a certain structure is a part of the "building," as
fitended by the restriction; or whether it is a porch, porte-cochere, or bay
window and not a part of -the building. These cases may be divided into two
classes; first, where no express exception of porches, porte-cocheres and bay
windows is made in the deed, and second, where such an express exception
is made. The same principles apply, however, to both classes of cases. In the
first class, an early Illinois case, Hawes v. Favor, 161 Ill. 441, held an open
wooden porch not to be a part of the "building," and so not within the restric-
tion as to placing a building within a certain limit. However in a later case
O'Gallagher v. Lockhart, 263 Ill. 489, 52 L. R. A. N. S. o44 (Note), when the
court encountered the proposition of the. modern three-story, brick, apartment
house porch, they held it to be a part of the "building"- and so a violation of
the building line restriction. This same .view has been taken by other juris-
dictions where the appendage or construction practically frustrates the inten-
tion of the parties to the building restriction. Bagnall v. Davies, i4o Mass. 76;
Ogontz Land Co. v. Johnson, i68 Pa. St. 178; Supplee v. Cohen, 81 N. J. Eq.
5oo; Alderson v. Cutting, 163 Cal. 503. Also see comment- on O'Gallagher.
v. Lockhart, supra, in 13 MicH. L. Rzv. 162 for this phase. In the second
class of cases where porches, porte-cocheres and bay windows are expressly
excepted Illinois has held, contra to the principal case, that a solid, closed-in
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porch, over the line, was a violation of the building restriction, 
and was
really part of the building and not a porch. Brandenburg'v. Lager, 
272 Ill.
622. Butf even in Illinois they held that a projection in the 
nature of h bay
window, built up solid from the ground, came within the exception 
of "bay
windows." Keith v. Goldsmith, 94 Ill. 488. The true ground 
for these de-
cisions, holding such structures as part of the building 
and not within the
exception of porches, -seems to be to carry out the intention 
of the parties,
in reserving an easement to light, air and vision. Loomis 
v. Collins, 2 Ill.
22i, and not to let mere architectural, technical phraseology 
defeat that
intention. Marsh v. Marsh, 89 N. J. Eq. iio. In the principal 
case the court
relied on the technical phraseology and the expert evidence 
of architects in
arriving at their decision, which accounts for its variance with 
the Illinois and
New Jersey cases. See ixi IxrL. L. Rzv. 576 for a discussion 
of the -Illinois
cases on this point.
Fwz--AccwDNTAL-LABLITy ?O_.-P occupied rooms over a gatage,
part of which was let to D, who kept a motor car there. 
D's servaht, an
unskilled chauffeur, having occasion in the course of his employment 
to move
the car started the engine, and without negligence on his part, 
and from some
unexplained reason, the petrol in the carburetor caught fire 
and- buriied the
car, the garage, and P's rooms and furniture. If the servant 
had promptly
turned off the tap from the carburetor to the petrol tank, the 
fire would have
done no harm; but he failed to do this. P sued for damages. 
The English
statute of 1774, substantially re-enacting 6 Anne; C. 3r, S. 
6, provided "No
action shall be maintained against any person in wnose building 
any fire shall
accidentally begin, nor any recompense be made by such person 
for any damage
suffered thereby, any law, usage or custom to the contrary notwithstanding."
Held, this act did not apply and D was liable. Musgraze v. Pandelis 
[i919] 2
K. B. 43.
The court argues that at common law one was liable for fire originating 
on
his own property: (i) for its mere escape; (2) or if the fire 
was negligently
or wilfully caused; or (3) on the principleof Rylands v. Fletcher 
(1868) L.
R. 3 H. L. 330, that he has brought a non-natural and .dangerous 
thing on his
premises which gets away from him and does harm. The Statutes 
of Anne,
and of 1774, were to meet the liability under (i) above, and 
did not apply
when the fire was caused either deliberately or negligently, under 
(2) above.
Filliter v. Phippard, ii Q. B. 347; if that is true as to (2) why should it 
affect
liability under (3) the principle -of -which existed long before 
Rylands v.
Fletcher was decided? The question then is, is a motor car 
with its petrol
tank full or partially filled with petrol, a dangerous thing to 
bring into.a
garage, within the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher? Lush, J., in 
the trial court,
and Bankes, Warrington, and Duke L. JJ. in the Court of Appeal, 
all agreed
that it was. The question then is, Did the fire accidentally 
begin? The fire
in the carburetor did accidentally begin; but it did not destroy 
the garage and
the plaintiff's property. It would almost immediately have burned 
out without
damage except for the negligence of D's servant. The fire that 
did the
damage was the raging fire from the petrol tank; this did not accidentally
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begin, but was the direct result of the servant's negligence in not turning off
the petrol tap. All judges concur. The statute exempted from liability any
one "on whose estate any fire shall accideritally begin!' In Vaughan v. Men-
love (1837), 3 Bing. N. C. 468, it seems to have been taken for granted, and
in the Filliter case above, in 1847, it was decided that "accidentally" did not
include negligently, and so left one liable, if a fire shall negligently begin on
one's premises. It was then urged that the statute applied only to accidental
origin of the ftire (e. g.-lightning) and would not relieve from liability for the
accidental escape of a fire not accidentally originating. For instance, if the
owner lighted a lamp, and it then accidentally exploded, and burned his
property and his neighbor's, the owner would be liable. Mr. Salmond, ToRts,
4th Ed. 247, thinks otherwise. He also thinks there is no sufficient authority
for saying that at common law there was any liability for the escape of fire
without negligence was shown. Still further he also thinks there is no
liability for negligently failing to prevent the escape of a fire started on one's
premises by a stranger. The case above does not seem to have cleared up this
matter to any great extent, and apparently unnecessarily brings in Rylands v.
Fletcher, to support a liability for a fire due to the negligence of defendant's
servant.
FISE[NG.-V10LAT01N 0 STATUTZ AGAIST PunSZ SXanGn.--In a prosecu-
tion for violation of a statute prohibiting fishing for salmon with a purse seine
east of a certain line in the Columbia river, the facts were stipulated to be
as follows: defendant was fishing with a purse seine outside forbidden
portion of the river when the tide carried his net towards such line; before
reaching same he closed his net completely, and allowed it to drift into the
forbidden area with the fish in it; when about zoo yards inside said line he
pulled the seine on to his boat- and removed the fish. Parties further stipulated
that, in such fishing, the act of removing the net from the water and, emptying
same is a necessary part of the fishing operation;. also that no fish were
caught in the seine inside said line. Held: since such act was a necessary
part of the fishing operation, defendant was guilty of a violation of the
statute. State v. Marco, (Ore., i919), 183 Pac. 6.53.
The coart quotes extensively from, and largely bases its decision on, the
case of "The Gcring" v. Queen, 27 Canada Sup. Rep. 271. In that case,
by treaty, the United States had renounced the right to "take, dry, or cure
fish" within three miles of the coast of British possessions in America. The
"Gerring," a U. S. fishing vessel, had been fishing outside the three-mile limit,
had pulled in its seine, and "pursed" same, attaching it to the boat, and the
crew was engaged in bailing out the fish. While so engaged, the vessel drifted
within, the three-mile limit and was seized. By a 3-2 vote the Canadian court
condemned the vessel as having been fishing in violation of the treaty and
Canadian law. While the majority of the court in that case did decide that
such acts were "fishing," and a violation of the treaty, the decision of con-
demnation appears to have been influenced by certain other circumstances.
The words of the treaty-"take dry or cure fish"--were interpreted as in-
tended to embrace all the intermediate acts (as the bailing here) between the
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taking itself and the preparing for human consumption; also the treaty pro-
vided that foreign fishing vessels might enter into the territorial waters 
for
wood, water, shelter or f:epairs, and for no other purpose; so, on this 
ground,
even the entry itself may have been sufficient to decide the question; 
further,
the court seemed to have been influenced by the fact that this kind of fishing
was considered contrary to public policy, as tending to annihilate 
the fish-
food supply, and hesitated to give immunity to the vessel under 
these cir-
cumstances. On the above-mentioned grounds it seems that'this 
case may
be distinguished from the case at hand. Probably the Oregon court 
based its
decision on the stipulation of the parties that the act of removing 
the seine
from the water was a necessaey part of the fishing operation,-otherwise 
it
is difficult to see on what grounds the case should be sustained; 
and it may be
noted that this court, also, was influenced by the fact that this kind 
of fishing
is looked upon with disfavor. These courts lay some stress upon 
the fact that,
antil the fish are actually in the boat, there is still a chance of jescape 
and that
therefore the operation of fishing is not complete; granting this, 
certainly in
these two cases no more fish could enter the net, and that would seem 
to be the
true prohibitiof bf such a statute against fishing. The fish are undoubtedly
reduced to possession and ownership when completely enclosed 
in the net-
State v. Shaw, 67 Ohio St. 157, 6o L. R. A. 48x,--and it would seem 
that, for
ordinary purposes, the act of fishing.should then be considered 
as complete,
and certainly so as against a statute such as the one here, the purpose 
of which
would seem merely to be to prevent the catching of fish out of the 
waters
in question.
INJuqcTio--CRIMiNAL P =DINIGSs-Where a United States attorney
was sought to Ife restrained by injunction from instituting criminal proceed-
ings under the War-Time Prohibition Act, upon the ground that he had 
trans-
cended his authority through misconstruction, of it. Held, That he 
canot
be so enjoined. Hoffmdn Brezng Co. v. M'Elligott (C. C. A. 2d Circ., igio),
259 Fed. 525.
In America the rule that a criminal prosecution will be enjoined where 
it
is based on an unconstitutional statute and property rights are threatened with
irreparable injury, is firmly established. Debbins v. Los Angeles, 49 L. Ed.
i69. Ward, J., in the principal case recognizes and endorses this rule, but 
will
not allow an extension of judicial power as sought by the petitioner here, say-
ing that such an extension would result-in an injury to our system of juris-
prudence far more serious than could be cbunterbalanced by the 
equity
effected. In support. of his position he quotes Arbuckle v. Blackburni 113 
Fed.
616, 65 L.R.A. 864, "that for equity to entertain a bill in this aspect 
would
be to subvert the administration of the criminal law, and deny the right 
of
trial by jury, bi substituting a court of equity to inquire into the commis-
sion of offenses where it would have no power to punish the parties if found'
guilty, an enlargement of jurisdiction opp6sed to reason and authority."
Upon this reasoning, Hough, J., in the principal case, disagrees with Ward, J.,
saying that the matter is one of degree, not of kind or .power, and questions
the distinction between unlawful acts of a prosecutor done Vrnder color of
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an unconstitutional statute and his unlawful acts committed under unlawful
usurpation of authority, pointing out the fact that a prosecutor's act may be
so preposterously unlawful (though not unconstitutional) as tco justify inter-
vention by equity. In further answer to this reasoning we may observe that
no more in a case of this kind is there sanctioned an inquiry by a court of
equity into disputed questions of fact than in cases for injunction against pro-
ceedings under unconstitutional statutes, so that the field of criminal litigation
in which the jury is the sacrosanct tribunal is avoided. And again, Hough, J's
position is allied with the spirit of mode:n legislation" providing for declaratory
judgments. Mich. P. A., 1919, Sec. i5o. See applying declaratory judgment
to a criminal question, Dyson v. Attorney General, (1012) i Ch. I58.
INJUNCTION-MATER AND SrRVANT-IxUCTiON To ENORca RzTaIcTIvn
COVENANT DzNIi.-Defendant was an ordinary employee of complainant, en-
gaged in operating a film-coating machine, and possessed of no peculiar skill
except such as ie acquired because of his specialized employment in com-
plainan~t's sersice. He terminated his employment with complainant and
started to work for competitor in violation of his restrictive covenant that he
would "not work for competitor in the United States for two years after leav-
ing complainant's employ, except in Alaska. Complainant seeks injunction
restraining him from so working, and from revealing trade secrets. Held,
no grounds for injunction restraining defendant from working for competitor;
but restrained defendant from' revealing trade secrets of complainant. East-
man Kodak Co. v. Warren, (1919) 178 N. Y. S. 14.
This court assimilates this covenant to those of indirect enforcement of
personal service contracts, and therefore denies the injunction because the
employee has no special skill. Qppenheimer v. Hirsch, 5 App. Div. 232; Osius
v. Hinchman, I5O Mich. 603; Sims v. Burnette, "55 Fla. 7o2, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.)
389 and note, 15 Ann Cas. 69o and note. According to what seems to be the
better view, on the other hand, such covenants are treated like similar cove-
nants in restraint of trade connected "with the sale of business, and injunctive
relief is given to the employer without reference to the skill of the employee.
MarveLv. Jonah, 83 N. J. Eq. 295, Ann. Cas. 1916 C 185 and note; Freuden-
thai v. Espey, 45 Colo. 488, 26 L. R. A. (N.S.) 961 and note; also 15 Ann. Cas.
694, and Eureka Laundry Co. v. Long, 146 Wis. .2o5. These courts proceed
upon the theory that the covenantee's remedy at law is inadequate,-the dam-
ages accruing frtom day to day, and it being impossible to ascertain the money
loss sustained with any degree of accuracy. Such covenants must be construed
with reference to the object sought to be secured by them,--and obviously
here it was to prevent the employee from using the skill, gained in complain-
ant's service, for.the benefit -of his competitor, and to help complainant main-
tain its monopoly in the trade. In these cases of 'valid contracts in restraint.of
trade we are not confronted with the difficulty found' in cases of indirect en.
forcement of personal service contracts, such as Lumley v. Wagner; i De. G.
M. & G. 604, where only partial performance can be decreed, and the damages
at law being at best a mere conjecture, an injunction will generally be given.
But, in giving such an injunction, equity will often stop to weigh the incon-
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venience and hardship on the defendant against the benefits and advantages
to the plaintiff, and the court's decision in this case showed that the scales
were carried in favor of the defendant. See also 16 MICH. L. REv. 647.
INTERNAL REVENUE-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-CHARGE ON RzSIDiARY ESTATE.
-Suit for instructions by executors against the trustee under testator's will,
and others. Held, The Federal Estate Tax imposed by Act of Congress Sept.
8, 1g16, as amended by Act March 3, 1917, and Act October 3, 1917, is charge-
able entirely against the residuary estate and not apportionable pro rata
among all devisees and legatees. Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co. (Mass.,
xgig), 124 N. E. 265.
The court in this case based its decision on the fact that the tax is char-
acterized, in the titles of the relevant sections of the statutes, as an* "Estate
Tax," and that it is "imposed upon the transfer of each net estate of every
decedent," and is to be paid out of the estate before distribution; fortified by
two further considerations, viz. (x) the contrast between the terms of these
acts and those of the War Revenue Act of i898, (30 U. S. Stats. at Large
464), which imposed a tax on legacii and distributive shares; and (2) the
design to establish an estate tax rather than a legacy tax, as clearly manifested
in the report .of the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Represen-
tatives, to which the bill had been referred. Though the present case treats
the tax as a charge upon the residue, the suggestion in the final paragraph of
the opinion that the testator might have provided in his will for its ultimate
incidence at some other point seems deserving of greater consideration. In
the case of a.-will'executed before the passage of an act, giving legacies to
collateral relatives, and naming testator's- children as residuary legatees, it
was held unjust to the latter to deduct the tax in toto from he residue as in
the case of administration expenses, and accordingly the tax was apportioned
among the several legaies-In re Douglass' Estate, 171 N. Y. S. 956. This
point was also given great consideration by the lower court In re Hamnlin,
172 N. Y. S. 787, where the tax was charged to the residuary estate because
the will contained no specific directions for apportionment; affirmed in 26
N. Y. 4o7, where the decision was based 'chiefly, as in the principal case, on
the intention of Congress. In Fuller v. Gale, 78 N. H. 544, the tax was directed
to be paid out of the estate and charged pro rata to each beneficiary, though
the court indicates that it would have given effect to an express direction
by the testator to the contrary. It is submitted that this decision was wrong,
inasmuch as the legacies were for definite amounts, which seems inconsistent
with an intention to give these definite amounts less the tax.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-QUALIFIED PRIVILEGES-COMMENT ON PUBLIC Acs
oF PUBLIC OFFICIALs.--The defendant publishing company published comments
and criticisms in its newspaper upon the punishment of prisoners in the
penitentiary of which the plaintiff was warden. This included the publication
of a convict's letter, stating that a person had been strung up with his hands
above his head to force a confession. Action for libel brought by the plain-
tiff warden and the court found, that the evidence showed the matter" to be
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substantially true and not actuated by any actual malice. Held, that there
exists a qualified privilege of free tomment upon public acts of public officials,
which are of public interest and an action for libel will not lie. McClung v.
Pulitzer Publishing Co. (Mo., 19x9) 214 S. W. X93.
There is a great difference between criticism, even harsh and severe,
whether in regard to a candidate for office, Or misconduct of public officials
Sin office, and the statement of facts against such a candidate or public official
in office. There are cases which fail to observe this distinction, but Post Pub-
lishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 530, and Burt v. Advertiser Co., 154 Mass. 238
-have clearly pointed this out. As said by Justice Holmes in the Massachusetts
case, "we agree with the defeAdant that the subject was of public interest and
that-the defendant would have the right to make fair comment, etc." But
later he says "it is enough to say that it is not a justificaion that the defend-
ant had reasonable cause to believe its charges to be tfue." There is a further
question in this type of case, 'where the matter, published as facts, is not
substantially true.- In the principle case, as dicta, the court cited with approval
a statement made in an earlier Missouri case, Cook v. Pulitzer Publishing Co.,
241 Mo. 326, "that where a defense of privileged comment on a matter of public
interest is presented b r the issues, the plaintiff may overcome the privilege
pleaded, either by proof that the publication was inspired by actual malice, or
that ihe facts published and commented upon were false.' In this view they
are sustained by many other jurisdictions, including an early Missouri case.
Smith v. Burris, lo6 Mo. 94; Burt v. Advertiser Co., supra; Post Publishing
Co. v. Hallam, supra; Poster v. Scripps, 39 Mich. 376; Eviston v. Cramer et al.,
57 Wis. 570; Hamilton v. Eno, 8x N. Y. 116; People v. Fuller, 238 Ill. 116.
But there is a growing number of authorities toward the view that a public
officer is, amenable to criticism in a public newspaper on matters of public
interest, without any liability on the part of the newspaper company, even if
the facts were not substantially true, as long as there was probable cause to
believe them to be true, and there was no improper motive in publishing.
Palmer v. Concord, 48 N. H. 211; O'Rourke v. Lewiston Daily Sun Publish-
ing Co., 89 Me 31o; Evening Post Co. v. Richardson, 113 Ky. 641; Neeb v.
Hope, III Pa. St. 145; Ferber v. Gazette and Bulletin Publishing Co., 212 Pa.
St. 367; 8 MicH. L. Rxv. 345. This same problem has also received much at-
tention and debate in relation to candidates for office. 7 MiCH. L. Rzv. 351;
18 MIcH. L. v. I, 1O4; 23 HARV. L. REV. 413.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WRKMAN'S COMPENSATION LAw--"INuRY ARIs-
ING IN COURSE OP EMPLOYMv NT"-ANTHRAx.-Servant's neck was slightly
cut while being shaved at a barber shop, and on the following day, while
working in a tannery handling hides, symptoms of anthrax first appeared,
from which disease his death resulted. Held, his death" was due to accidental
injury "arising out of and in the course of his employment," and that his
widow was entitled to compensation. Eldridge v. Endicott, Johnson & Co.,
et al. (1gig) 177 N. Y. S. 863.
'This decision seems to be a reversal of the result reached in this case in
the lower court, reported in Tnt BuLLETIN, N. Yr. Vol. I, No. 8, p. 8 (cited
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in HONNOLD, WORKME
N'S COMPENSATION, p. 493). The courts appear to be :
a state of change in regard to these workmen's Eompensation cases. The 
mod-
em tendency seems to favor making the master an absolute insurer against
all risks incidental to the course of employment. Hiers v. Hull & Co., 
178
App. Div. 350; Horrigan v. Post Standard Co., 224 N. Y. 620; Dove v. Alpena
Hide and Leather Co., i98 Mich. 132, where servant in tannery, handling hides,
died from septic infeetion, resulting from deceased's inhaling dust from 
the
hides; Blaess v. Dolph, 195 Mich. 137, where undertaker's assistant died' 
from
a virulent type of streptococcus infection, which he contracted, in -the course
of handling a dead body, through a slight unexplained cut on his ring finger;
It appeared in evidence in this last case that the only probable source of 
de-
ceased's infection was through contact with the dead body of a person 
who
had such an infection. So, too, in the case at hand it is a matter 
of common
knowledge that "anthrax is primarily a disease of animals, such 
as sheep"
(McCauley v. Imperial Woolen Co., et al., 261 Pa. St 312) and that 
it is
almost universally contracted from handling infected hides or wool, and there-
fore it seems the court was justified in holding deceased's death was caused
by accidental injury "arising out of and in course of his employment:' 
At
first sight it might appear that the case of Chandler v. Great Western Ry. Co.,
[i9m] io6 I. T. 479, is in conflict with these decisions, but there 
is really
an essential point of distinction between them. There a railway fireman, 
while
at home, cut his finger, sucked the wound, bound, it up ana went to 
work.
While working, coal dust,-oil, grease and other matters worked through 
the
bandage into the cut, and septic infection resulted which necessitated 
ampu-
tation of -his finger. The court held he could not recover, because to attribute
this inftction to his employment was at best a mere "surmise, conjecture, 
or
guess," there being many possible sources of such infection. He might have
gotten it from the cut alone, from sucking the cut, from dust in the road, or
from various other imaginable sources which might give rise to such an in-
fection. - This case is distinguishable from the general line of cases, here set
out, in that this fireman's septic infection, unlike anthrax or streptococcus
infection, was attributable to no one specific probable source, as was true
in the case ;f the wool-sorter and of the undertaker, and therefore the court
did not have sufficient grounds of probability on which to base a decision that
it was an accidental injury "arising otut of and in course of his employment:"
See other articles as to accidents "arising out of and in course of employment"
in 12 MIcE. L. Rv. 614, 688; 14 Mic. L. REv. 525; I5 MicH. L. Rsv. 92,
666; 16 MicH. L. Rev. 179, 462; 18 Micn. L. RXV. 72; 25 YALE L. JOUR. 333;
26 YALE L. JOUR. 76.
NAviGABLz WAmrus-Ri'AwAAN RiHTs--AccaRox.-From 1885 to 1895
the bottom of *the river in front of the plaintiffs property was used as a
dumping ground under the direction of government officials. The effect of
such deftosits was to accelerate deposit of alluvion, whereby fifty-four acres
of new land were formed ort the plaintiff's riparian front.' Plaintiff contracted
to convey this land to the defendant who refused to perform on the ground
that he would be getting a iubtful title. Plaintiff sued for the purchase price.
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The court treated the action as if it were a bill for specific performance, and
held, that since the formation of the new land was not due solely to natural
processes, the plaintiff's title was doubtful; hence, the court would not compel
defendant to acept it.-Black v. American International Corporation, (Pa.
1919) 1o AtI. 737.
That land formed by the gradual and imperceptible deposit of alluvion in
a stream belongs to the owner of the adjacent land to which it is attached
was settled long ago.--Gifford v. Yarborough, (x828) 8 Bing. 163; Warren 
v.
Chambers, 25 Ark. i2o. The cases are agreed thatthe riparian owner acquires
no new land which was not formed gradually and imperceptibly, but there has
been some discussion as to whether or not the deposit of alluvion must have
been. caused solely by natural processes; i. e., as to the effect of the presence
of artificial conditions aiding the accretions. In Halsey v. McCormick, 18
N. Y. 147, the court said obiter, "I find no such distinction in the books. If
by some artificial structure or impediment in the stream, the current should
be made to impinge more strongly against one bank, causing it imperceptibly
to wear away, and causing a corresponding accretion on the opposite bank, I
am not prepared to say that the riparian owned would not be entitled to the
alluvion thus formed,' especially as against the party who caused it." It was
held in Tatum v. St. Louis, 125 Mo. 647, that the "riparian owner is entitled
to the land formed by gradual and imperceptible accretions from the water,
regardless of the cause which produced it. This right he cannot be deprived
of by the acts of others over whom he has no control and for which he is in no
way responsible." And Mr. Justice Swayne in St. Clair County v. Lovingstom,
23 Wall. 66, referring to accretions caused by artificial obstructions, said, "The
proximate cause was the deposits made by the water. * * * Whether thq flow
of the water was natural or affected by artificial means is immaterial." To
the same effect is Adams v. Frothingham, s Mass. 352. And the Supreme
Court of Tennessee decided that a riparian owner is the owner of accretions
to" his banks, even though those accretions are caused, or greatly accelerated,
by the action of the city and the public in making such banks its dumping
grounds. Memphis v. Waite, io2 Tern. 274. It should be noted that all of
the above cases were ones in which the artificial obstructions or deposits were
made by persons other than the riparian owner who was claiming the newly
formed land. It is clear that the riparian owner will not be .permitted to
increase.his estate by creating an artificial condition for the purpose of effect-
ing such increase. Halsey v. McCormick, supra; Attorxey General v. Chamb-
ers, 4 D. G. & J. 55, 69; and see Lovingston v. St. Clair County, 64 Ill. 56.
It is also evident that the major portion of the new land must be formed by
the deposit of alluvion, and must not consist of the artificial matter deposited
by human agencies. Just what proportion of the new land must.consist of
alluvion is, of course, incapable of determination by any rule of thumb, and
for this reason the court in the principal case was justified in refusing the
plaintiff relief. See Sebring v. Mersereau, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 344.
PAUPXRS--"POOR PtRSONS"-CoNTRIBUTION VOR SuppoaRT.-In a proceeding
to make defendants, parents of an alleged pauper, contribute money for his
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support, where it appeared that the son owned an undivided 
one-eighth inter-
est in farm lands worth $6,6o0, free from all incumbrances 
save a life estate
of a woman 58 years old and in ill health, and that he had 
made no effort to
borrow on or sell such interest, held, that, under Section 
2252 of the Iowa
Code, the trial court should have -set aside the verdict 
against defendants, or
have sustained their plea in abatement and deferred the 
question of contribu-
tion until said property w as disposed of under direction 
of the court, or it
became apparent that disposition was impossible. Polk County 
v. Owen, (Ia.,
x9119), 174 N. W. 99.
It will be noticed that the court did not reverse its former 
holdings that
where the alleged pauper is possessed of some property it 
will be a question of
fact whether, despite such ownership, he is a poor person 
within the meaning
of the statute. Jasper County v. Osborn, 59 Ia. 2o8. 
Here the court simply
sets aside a verdict as being against the evidence. No doubt 
the decision was
partly influenced by the presence of a statutory definition 
of "poor persons,"
who are stated to be "those who have no property, exempt 
or otherwise, and
are unable, because of physical or mental disabilities, 
to earn a living by
labor." Yet the courts have inclined to relax the rigidity 
of the statute by
holding that the test is whether one be without property 
which can aid in his
support or out of which funds may be realized for his maintenance. 
Hamil-
ton v. Hollis, 141 Ia. 477; Wallingford v. Southington, x6 Conn. 
43. Cf. Peters
v. Town of Litchfield,-34 Conn. 264. The rule has 
been laid down in some
cases that, where a person is possessed of property not 
absolutely indispen-
sable for daily use, he must apply it to his support by sale 
or security, and
cannot, while possessing such property, be regarded as a pauper. 
Ettrick v.
Bangor, 84 Wis. 256. In 3o Cyc. io65 lppears the above 
rule together with
what is said to be a different 6ne, but it is submitted that 
in the last analysis
the two rules mean practically the same thing. This may 
account for the
apparent lack of harmony in the Connecticut cases therein cited. 
For a differ-
ent statenent of the rule in the Ettrick case, supra, see Poplin v. Hawke, 
8 N.
SMrzs-UNPLANmE Ciops SusJECr To SAL.-By agreement 
purporting to
be a present and absolute sale, Klinke contracted, on March' 3rd, 1917, to
deliver to Hamilton his entire crop of 1917 beans from 3o acres of 
a certain
tract, at a stipulated price, by October 3o, 1917. The beans were not planted
until the following June; K. failed to deliver same to H. as agreed, 
but
executed a chattel mortgage on the crot to Hatton, the other defendant herein.
The price having advanced, plaintiff, Hamilton, brings this action, after hav-
ing the sheriff seize the beans. Held: the future crop was subject to 
sale
and title passed. Hamilton v. Klinke et at, (Cal., 1919), 183 Pac. 675.
A ale is defined in the California Code as a "contract by which, for 
a
pecuniary consideration called a price, one transfers to another an interest 
in
property." Defendant here submitted that, as the property did not exist, title
to it did not exist, and therefore could not be transferred, again quoting 
the
California Code: "the subject of sale must be property the title to which
can be immediately transferred from the seller fo the buyer.' The 
court
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found that the.intention of the parties was undoubtedly to pass title, especially
in view of a term of the contract that "it is mutually understood that this
contract--constitutes an absolute sale." In deciding that title passed the
court must have proceeded upon the theory of potential interest. But, on this
question, "the better view seems to be that a sale of A certain crop---made
before the seeds were planted passes no title to the buiyer, for the reason
that n6thing can be the subject of bargain and sale which has no actual
or potential existence at the date of sale, and, until the crop is actually grow-
ing, or at least until- the seeds are planted, the crop cannot be said to have
even a potential existence." RULING CASE LAW, Vol. 23, p. 1248, citing num-
erous cases, as, Long v. Hines, 40 Kan. 216. Such transaction does seem, by
authority of many cases, to pass an equitable ilterest which will attach when
the crop comes into existence. RuLiNG CASE LAW, Vol. 23, P. I248,-Mayer
& Co. v. Taylor & Co., 69 Ala. 403. But, on the other hand, some cases seem
to hold tat such crops'have a potential existence and can be the subject of
-sale or.mortgage. Arques v. Wasson, 5i Cal. 62o, and that title will pass when
the crop comes into existence. Baxter v. Bush, 29 Vt. 465. The court in the
case at hand has apparently adopted this latter view, but seems. to have ex-
tended it at least, in intimating that present title passes; possibly this may be
in accordance with a theory suggested in WzI,ISToN oN SALES, § 133, as fol-
lows: "It seems to be assumed that title passes as.of date of bargain. Accu-
rately expressed this means that wlien the goods come into existence title to
them passes free from any defects of title due to rights which have accrued
since the time of the original bargain." Holding as the court does here that
title passed, they nevertheless subject this title to the mortgage to Hatton,
made after the beans came into existencd; it does not clearly appear from this
report whether or no Hatton had notice of the plaintiff's claim. It would seem
that if K. vested in plaintiff all his potential interest at the time of the orig-
inal bargain, no interest would have ever been in K. sufficient to enable him
to make a valid mortgage of same; and that this differs from a sale of goods
in existence with no delivery and a subsequent mortgage *to a purchaser for
value by the vendor remaining in possession. Hull v. Hull, 48 Conn. 250.
TENANCY IN CommoN-LxAS4 BY COTNAIN BY MVES AND BOuNDs VoD-
Anr.E NOT VoID.-Defendants took a lease by metes and bounds of a portion
-of premises of which the lessors were tenants in common with plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs did not join in the execution of the lease and sued in ejectment.
Held, that the lease was not void, but voidable at the option of the cotenants
-who did not participate in the execution of the lease; but thaf even after
said cotenants elected to avoid the lease, the defendants were entitled to
occupy the portion described in the lease as tenants in common with them
until partition.-Pastine et al v. Altman et al, (Conn., i919), 107 At]. 8o3.
The question involved in the principal case has arisen usually in cases of
conveyance in fee, and courts hve not agreed upon it. The oldest doctrine
in the United States was that such a deed was absolutely void; (Porter v.
Hill, 9 Mass. 34; Griswold v. Johnson, 5 Conn. 363) but this was modified in
Johnson V. Stevens, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 431 and Hartford & Salisbury Ore Co.
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v. Miller, 41 Conn. 112, holding such a deed voidable. The great majority
of courts will give effect to the deed so far as this may be done without pre-
judicing the rights of partition and joint occupation of the non-assenting co-
tenants. Soutter v. Porter, 27 Maine 405; McKey v. Welch, 22 Tex. 390.
And theicourts are inclined to protect the purchaser as far as possible. Furrh v.
Winston, 66 Tex. 521. Accordingly, the great weight of authority holds that,
if upon partition, the grantor acquires an estate in severalty in the premises
described in the deed, or any part thereof, this subsequently acquired estate
vests in the grantee because of the doctrine of estoppel. Kenoye v. Brown,
82 Miss. 607; Great Falls Co. v. Worster, 15 N. H. 412; Cressey v. Cressey,
215 Mass. 65. However, the grantee can under no circumstances, acquire any
interest in any part of the common property not described in his deed. Great
Falls Co. v. Woriter, supra; Soutter v. Porter, supra. What has been consid-
ered a different view was taken in Lessee of White v. Sayre, 2 Ohio 11o,
where it was held that since a cotenant can convey his interest in the entire
common property, he can do so with regard to a specifically described part
of that property. This view was approved in Robinett v. Preston's Heirs,
2 Rob. (Va.) 278; and Stark v. Barrett, 15 Cal. 361. Of course, this interest
which he conveys is merely an undivided one, for he had no other to convey.
Gates v. Salmon, 35 Cal. 576. But see Barnhart v. Campbell, 5o Mo. 597.
However, upon analyzing the practical results of the Ohio doctrine, it will be
seen that it differs little, if any, from the general view. The grantee acquires
the same rights, although the court travels a different route in arriving at the
result. The Ohio court says; in effect, that such a deed is valid, and there-
fore the grantee acquires the same rights in the particularly described premises
as the grantor had; while other courts, supposedly following a different doc-
trine, say, in effect, that such a deed is voidable at the option of the other
cotenants; if they confirm it, the grantee gets an estate in severalty in the
part described, but if ihey elect to avoid it, the grantee has, nevertheless, the
same rights in the described portion as the grantor had. It seems, therefore,
that nearly all courts are agreed upon the result which should be attained in
such cases, and that the court in the principal case achieved that result, and
unknowingly made a decision practically in accord with the weight of author-
ity. See 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 573, note; FRIMMAN ON COTSNANCY AND PAR-
TITION, secs. 199-288.
TREASON-EVIDXNC-OvRT Ac.-In a case where defendant was indicted
for treason and the overt act was proved-by the testimony of one witness
plus circumstantial evidence so that proof of the oveit act was well-nigh con-
clusive in fact and where it was held that it is necessary for conviction of
treason to produce two witnesses to the whole overt act, there was the fol-
lowing dictum, "It may be possible to piece together bits of the overt act, but
if so, each bit must have the support of two oaths." United States v. Robin-
son (D. C., S. D., N. Y., i919), 259 Fed. 685.
The probable attitude of the courts on the point raised in the above
dictum of Hand, J., has long been a matter for speculation in cases suggest-
ing it, but no case directly involving it has arisen in any qf our courts. The
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application of a rule thus broadening the method of this matter of proof, so
guardedly conceded by Hand, J., would assuredly render conviction of trea-
son possible in many cases where no reasonable doubt is left as to the: de-
fendant's guilt, but where strict adherence to the letter of the Constitution
would not allow conviction. Indeed, the debates over Article 3, Sec. 2, rela-
tive to treason as chronicled in MADISON'S JOURNAL (Doc. Hist. of U. S., Vol.
3, pp. 568-57) show that there was not unanimity of opinion as to the wis-
dom of. narrowing the methods of proof of the overt act. If the framers
were themselves doubtful as to the limits of such proof, it seems justifiable
that when circumstances arise revealing an imperative necessity for broaden-
ing the methods' of proof of the overt act (lest persotis unquestionably guilty
go unscathed), it should be done if the addition or increase allowed be not
inharmonious or repugnant to the reason for the twQ-witness rule in treason
trials. The real reason basing the requirement of this rule is that in view
of the great weight of the oath or duty of allegiance against the probability
of the fact of treason, it has been deemed expedient b provide for conviction
only by the method prescribed. I GREENL. Ev., Sec. 255. Keeping in mind
this reason; it is evident that while a lessening in the authenticity and sol-
emnity of the proof of the overt act would be repugnant to the rule, a change
in the method of proof of the same act which in no way impaired its solemn
and authentic establishment would not come within its condemnation. Upon
this reasoning it is possible to reconcile the departure of the same court in
which the principal case came up from the letter of the Constitution in the
case of United States v. Frincke (D. C., S. D., N. Y., igig), 259 Fed. 673.
Here, Mayer, J.. decided that in a prosecution for treason where the overt
act is single, continuous and composite, though made up of several circum-
.stances and stages, satisfaction of the Constitution does not require the tes-
timony of two witnesses to each circumstance in every stage. This judge also
intimated, however, that where, as in the principal case, the overt act was not
continuous and composite, the testimony of two witnesses would be necessary
to prove each circumstance going to establish the commission of the overt
act. Thus perhaps the dictum in the principal case may be taken as indicative
of the modern tendancy of the law relative to proof of the "overt act" desig-
nated in the Constitution, Art. 3, Sec. 3.
WILLS-TESTAMENTARY CHARACTER or INSTRUMENT-CONTINENT. WILL.-
An instrument duly executed according to the statute read, "In case of any
serious accident, after my just debts are paid, I direct that my aunt, Miss
Mary E. Clark, take entire charge of my estate for disposal as she sees fit"
At the trial it appeared that the decedent, a resident of Iowa, contemplated
a visit to California. He met with no serious accident, and died a natural
death. Held, instrument was testamentary in character, not a contingent
will, and so entitled to probate. In re Tinsley's Will (Ia., igig), 174 N. W. 4.
The holdinq of this paper to be a will illustrates the length to which courts
will go in construing informal documents as testamentary in character. The
tendency is to find the animus testandi if there is any reasonable way possible.
Accordingly, in form the writing may be a series of diary entries (Reagan v.
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Stanley, 79 Tenn. 316), an indorsement on the back of a promissory note
(Hunt v. Hunt, 4 N. H. 434), a letter to the donee (Byers v. Hoppe, 6I Md.
206; High's Appeal, 2 Doug. 515), or a certificate of unorthodox orthography
(Mitchell v. Donohue, oo Cal. 2o2). As to the other point in the instant
case, namely, whether the instrument was conditional or not, the decision ap-
pears to be consonant with the policy of the courts to be averse to hold such
wills conditional. In a leading case the following rule of construction was laid
down: "When the event which constitutes the contingency expressed in the
instrument can be reasonably construed to have been the occasion foi" making
the will at a particular time rather than as the reason for making it in a par-
ticular way, it should be so construed; and * * * that, unless it clearly appear
from the instrument itself that it was not to operate in a certain event, it
will be entitled to probate." Forquer's Estate, 216 Pa. St. 331, annotated in
8 Ann. Cas. ii5o. See also to the same effect: In the Goods of Dobson
(x866), L. R. i P. D. 88; In the Goods of Mayd, 6 P. D. I7; In the Goods of
Spratt (1897), P. D. 28; Likefield v. Likefield, 82 Ky. 589; Damon v. Damon,
8 Allen 192. The question is, does the language show why decedent made a
will, or does it show the condition on which he desires it to be operative as
a will? The tendency is to hold the former unless the latter is clear from
the language; and in that case he has made a will, and the reason why he
did it is unimportant. In the latter 'case, he has not, as events have fallen,
made any will. The -noticeable lack 6f harmony in both the English and
American cases is due to the particular circumstances surrounding the par-
ticular instrument construed. 'In fact, as was said by Mr. Justice Holmes in
Eaton v. Broum, 193 U. S. 416, "Each case must stand so much on its own
circumstances and words." On the whole, the decision in the principal case
appears unassailable, and the words, "in case of any serious accident," seem
to be rightly deemed to have indicated a contemplation of death.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATiON LAw-HFRNIA1-IR USAL TO UNDERGO OPERA-
Tiox.-A workman, in the course of his employment, suffered an accidental
injury which resulted in a slight hernia. The evidence showed that the dis-
ability could be removed only by a surgical operation under.a local or gen-"
eral anesthetic. He refu~ed to undergo the operation tendered him by his
employer. Held; his refusal was unreasonable and there should be n'o award
of compensation until he submitted, to the operation, which was not "attended
with danger to life or health." O'Brien v. Albert A. Albrecht Co., et al.
(Mich., 1919)', 172 N. W. 6o.
Undoubtedly the test applied by the court in the instant case is correct, i. e.,
"whether the workman in refusing to undergo the surgical operation acted
unreasonably". HONNOLD, WoRxmztN's COMPENSATION, 526. Yet, on almost
identical facts, another'court of last resort has held that a refusal to undergo
an operation for hernia is not unreasonable. McNally v. Hudson & Manhat-
tan R. Co., 87 N: J. L. 455. Such a refusal on the part of a plaintiff in a per-
sonal injury case is not prejudicial. Blate v. Third Ave. R. R. Co. (N. Y.),
44 App. Div. 163. The fact that the hernia can be cured by an operation does
not preclude the recovery of damages as for a permanent injury, (Id., also,
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Guild v. Portland Ry. L. & P. Co., 64 Or. 570), or of compensation as for per-
manent disability (Feldman v. Braunstein, 87 N. J. L. 2o). If only a trifling
o)eration is in question, British and American courts unquestionably supporb
the decision in the principal case: Dowds v. Bennie & Son, 40 Scottish L. R.
239, (massage of ankle); Anderson v. Baird & Co., 40 S. L. R. 263, (slight
operation on thumb); Donnelly v. Baird & Co., 45 S. L. R. 34, (amputation
of finger); Lesh v. Ill. Steel Co., 163 Wis. 124, (removing nodule on leg);
Kricinovitch v. Am. Car & Foundry Cb., 192 Mich. 687, (loosening up tissue
of leg). On the other hand it appears settled that a refusal to umdergo a
"major" operation is reasonable, Jendrus v. Detroit Steel Products Co., 178
Mich. 265, (serious abdominal operation). The apparent difficulty- is to de-
termine whether "herniotomy" is a "major" operation. It is analogous to the
frequently recurring question in Army Courts Martial, i. e., whether the oper-
ation "involves risk of life." W. D., 19o6, G. 0. 43, Par. II. Some courts
hold that slight danger of death is no excuse for refusal, even if the operation
may be considered "serious". Joliet Motor Co. v. Industrial Board of Ill.,
28o Ill. x48, (removal of cataract from eye). But in .McNally v. Hudson &
Manhattan R. Co., supra, the court says, "Although the peril to life seems to
be very slight, forty-eight chances in twenty-three thousand, nevertheless the
idea is appalling to one's conscience that a human being should be compelled
to take a risk of death, however slight that may be, in order that the pecuniary
obligation created by the law in his favor against his employer may be min-
imized." See note to McNally case, supra, io N. C. C. A. i85; note to Joliet
Motor Co. case, supra, 15 N. C. C. A. 75; 26 YAzs LAW Joum. 16o; L. R. A.
xgi6A, 139, 259; 19i7D, 174; Anno. Cas. x9 isD, 482.
